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The Relational Responding Task (RRT) is a novel implicit measure of beliefs. In this 
exploratory study, I sought to examine the utility of the RRT as an implicit measure of 
cognitive reactivity using a convenient sample of individuals without clinical symptoms of 
depression by replicating the study of Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). Participants 
completed the RRT before and after a sad mood induction procedure, as well as 
questionnaires about depressive symptoms, psychological flexibility and rumination. The 
RRT asked participants to respond to antecedent-affect statements based on congruent and 
incongruent responding rules. The results showed that prior to mood-induction the normal 
and mild-moderate depressive groups displayed antecedent-affect congruent response bias. 
Post mood induction the normal group continued to display an antecedent-affect congruent 
response bias, whereas the mild-moderate depressive group displayed an antecedent-affect 
incongruent response bias. These were consistent with the study by Hussey and Barnes-
Holmes (2012). However, the pattern of differential change was not found when groups were 
created using the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II or the Rumination-Reflection 
Questionnaire, which is inconsistent with Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). Therefore, my 
study provides an important first step toward validating RRT as an implicit measure of 
cognitive reactivity. The limitations of the current study and implications for future research 
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Within the field of psychology there is an ever growing body of literature and 
research focused on cognition and depression. A depressed individual is commonly 
characterised as having a negative affect and negative bias towards themselves, the world and 
the future (Clarke, Beck, & Alford, 1999). However, depression is more than negative affect 
and negative bias. It is a mood disorder which can be described by both physical and 
psychological characteristics (Barlow & Durand, 2015). Dysphoric mood, anhedonia and 
suicidal ideation are common psychological characteristics of depression (Barlow & Durand, 
2015). Whereas, a change in sleeping patterns, appetite and loss of energy are common 
physical characteristics of depression (Barlow & Durand, 2015). These characteristics are 
well established and supported by literature (see DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) and depressed individuals can display a variety of characteristics which can also vary 
in severity which results in various depressive subtypes (see DSM-5 mood disorders; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To understand the variability of depression, 
research has been dedicated to understanding risk factors associated with the onset, 
maintenance and recurrence of depression. Findings suggests factors associated with the 
onset are different from those associated with maintenance and recurrence of depression 
(Lewinsohn, Allen, Seeley, & Gotlib, 1999).  
The recurrence of depression and depressive episodes is an intrinsic characteristic of 
depression. Research has shown, remitted depressed individuals remain vulnerable to future 
depressive episodes, which can be triggered by various life events and environmental 
stressors (Kendler, Thornton & Gardner, 2000; Mitchell, Parker, Gladston, Wilhelm & 
Austin, 2003). Unfortunately, the relationship between risk factors and the recurrence of 
depression and depressive episodes is dynamic and complex because it involves an 
interaction between biological, social and psychological factors (Segal & Dobson, 1992; 





trigger the recurrence of depression or depressive episode in some people, does not trigger it 
in others (Brown & Harris, 1978). 
Despite the complex relationship, psychological and cognitive factors have shown to 
be good predictors for the recurrence of depression (Lau, Segal, & Williams, 2004). Research 
has indicated that formally depressed individuals’ display dysfunctional patterns of beliefs 
and behaviours that are elicited within the context of a sad mood state. The dysfunctional 
reactivity to the sad mood has shown to be a good predictor to relapse of depression (see Lau 
et al., 2004). Cognitive reactivity (Lau et al., 2004), psychological flexibility (Bond et al., 
2011) and rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) are all cognitive approaches that can be 
utilized to explain the interaction between sad mood states and the recurrence of depression. 
Interestingly, all three of these concepts are intrinsically similar, therefore to avoid confusion 
each one will described below.   
Firstly, cognitive reactivity is one cognitive approach that refers to negative thinking 
patterns that are elicited by a low mood, in particular a sad mood is likely to elicit thinking 
patterns associated with previous sad moods (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). These 
patterns of thinking are often identified as negative attitudes and biases which is an indicative 
characteristic of depression (Clarke et al., 1999).  
Psychological flexibility is another cognitive approach that is very similar to cognitive 
reactivity. This concept refers to individuals being consciously present in the moment and 
depending on the situation, they are able to change or persist in behaviour that is congruent 
with values and goals (Bond et al., 2011). For instance, research has shown when depressed 
individuals experience undesirable thoughts and feelings caused by a sad mood, their 
behaviour becomes inflexible and can be difficult to change to match certain values or goals 
(Bond et al., 2011; Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). Whereas non-depressed individuals are 





behaviour remains flexible and can be changed to match certain values or goals (Bond et al., 
2011; Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). The process of psychological flexibility is identified 
as a core functional component of depression (Bond et al., 2011) because depressed 
individuals are more likely to display inflexible thinking and behaviour that is biased towards 
negative attitudes and beliefs. 
Finally, rumination is a cognitive concept that is strongly associated with 
psychological flexibility, both of these are susceptible to sad mood effects which increases 
previously depressed individuals’ vulnerability to depression (Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2007; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Rumination is 
defined as a tendency to repetitively think about aspects of an upsetting situation (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Research has shown that previously depressed people display greater 
levels of rumination than non-depressed individuals, and these are exacerbated by sad mood 
(Lo et al., 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
In summary, research has shown that when previously depressed and never depressed 
individuals experience a sad mood, it has differential effects on cognitive reactivity, 
psychological flexibility and rumination. These differences help understand dysfunctional 
cognitive processes in depression, which provides support for cognitive theories (Clarke et 
al., 1999; Teasdale, 1988). To ensure these concepts are indeed risk factors to the recurrence 
of depression it is important to have valid measurement tools. However, before any tools are 
discussed, it is important to understand cognitive theories of depression. 
Cognitive models  
 Becks Cognitive Model 
Cognitive theories of depression assist in understanding the relationship between 
depressive cognition and recurrence of depression. Becks cognitive model of depression 





be cognitively vulnerable to depressive maintenance and relapse. Becks model provides a 
cognitive triad (Beck et al., 1979) which characterises cognitive patterns of depression. The 
triad refers to an idiosyncratic cognitive pattern that results in the individual processing 
information about the self, the future and their experiences in a negative manner. 
This cognitive model proposes that depressed individuals hold negative dysfunctional 
beliefs and schemas about the self, world and future. These negative beliefs and schemas 
arguably remain latent until they are activated by a severe life event that is congruent with the 
negative schema (Beck et al., 1979; Monroe & Simons, 1991). For instance, a formally 
depressed individual will display positive beliefs and schemas, but when they experience a 
negative event they will begin to display negative beliefs and schemas. 
Becks model further postulates that negative life events can elicit depressive cognition 
(e.g., negative beliefs and schemas), which impedes encoding, processing and retrieval of 
information (Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979). For instance, when depressed individual’s 
experience a negative life event, it will elicit dysfunctional cognitive processing. This results 
in a preferential bias towards negative schema-congruent information during encoding and 
retrieval (e.g., recalling sad memories and focusing on negative comments; Becks et al., 
1979). Favouring negative information acts as a confirmation for the depressed individuals’ 
negative beliefs and schemas. For example, when a remitted depressed person experiences a 
dysphoric mood they are likely to attribute any negative or unpleasant experiences to a 
psychological or physical inadequacy within themselves because it is congruent with their 
self-schema (Beck et al., 1979). The information processing bias reinforces depressed 
individuals negative dysfunctional beliefs and schemas which leads to symptoms of 
depression (Beck 1967; Beck et al., 1979). 
In summary, Becks model identifies there is a relationship between mood and 





which increases remitted depressed individuals vulnerability to future depressive episodes. 
Based on this model, we should expect to see differences between never depressed and 
formally depressed individuals’ cognitive schemas (e.g., view of the self, words and future). 
Researchers have commonly used the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & 
Beck, 1978) as a measure of dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., “my value as a person depends 
greatly on what others think of me”) to support Becks cognitive theory of identifiable 
cognitive differences. However, many studies using the DAS failed to find any reliable 
differences in cognition between individuals vulnerable to depression and those not 
vulnerable to depression (e.g., Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Silberman, Silverman, & 
Eardley, 1984; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984; see Lau, Segal, & Williams, 2004 for 
more details). Furthermore, Becks model is unable to explain why no differences were found. 
Differential Activation hypothesis  
Teasdale’s differential activation hypothesis (DAH; 1988) was developed upon Becks 
cognitive model as an additional account of cognitive vulnerability to depression. In addition 
to Becks model, Teasdale proposed recovered depressed patients are more likely to display 
differences in processing information which are activated by a dysphoric mood. Therefore, 
the DAH proposes there are differential mood effects on information processing between 
recovered depressed patients and non-depressed controls. Whereby, dysphoric mood activates 
maladaptive cognitive processes within recovered depressed patients but does not activate 
maladaptive cognitive processes within controls (not vulnerable to depression). This 
phenomenon is referred to as ‘cognitive reactivity’.  
Teasdale developed the DAH upon three assumptions. Firstly, the DAH assumes that 
depressed mood influences cognitive processes which results in a negative bias. Like Becks 
model, the negative bias results in maladaptive beliefs and interpretations about the self, the 





processing which is likely to increase depression. It is proposed that current events and 
information retrieved from memory are interpreted negatively which results in increasing 
depression. This assumption is similar to becks model which proposed, the bias of negative 
information processing reinforces dysfunctional beliefs which results to symptoms of 
depression (Beck 1967; Beck et al., 1979). Finally, it is assumed that depression will affect 
cognitive processing in similar ways for some people, however there will be differences in 
the specific nature of how the cognitive processes are affected. This assumption is important 
because it can be used to explain the differences in severity and persistence of a depressive 
episode. In summary the DAH proposes that depressive mood affects information processing, 
which increases the likelihood and ease of accessing negative interpretations and schemas, 
which in turn increases the likelihood of depression reoccurring.  
Mood-congruent (Blaney, 1986; Teasdale, 1983) and mood-dependent (Bower, 1981; 
Eich, 1995) memory research provides evidence for mood effects on information processing, 
which supports Teasdale’s DAH. Mood-congruous memory refers to individuals displaying a 
bias when encoding or retrieving information that is congruent with the mood state of the 
individual (Blaney, 1986; Teasdale, 1983). For example, depressive individuals experiencing 
a dysphoric mood, are more likely to display a bias towards congruent negative information 
during encoding or retrieval than incongruent positive information. In addition, mood-
dependent memory refers to the enhancement of retrieving information when the mood state 
at the time of retrieval is congruent with the mood state during the time of encoding, 
irrespective of the emotional valence of the information (Bower, 1981; Eich, 1995). For 
example, when an individual is experiencing a depressive mood, they are more likely to 
remember information that was encoded in a previously depressive mood, then information 





mood-dependent research provides evidence of emotional states affecting information 
processing systems.  
The DAH postulates that mood effects are able to account for the lack of identifiable 
differences in dysfunctional cognition in previous studies using the DAS (Hamilton & 
Abramson, 1983; Silverman, Silverman, & Eardley, 1984; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 
1984). Previously studies only measured dysfunctional cognitions during an euthymic mood. 
According to the DAH, recovered depressed patients are likely to display normal cognitive 
processing when they are not experiencing a dysphoric mood. This accounts for the results of 
the aforementioned DAS studies. However, the DAH further predicts there will be 
differences in cognitive processes when the recovered depressed patients are experiencing a 
dysphoric mood. Studies using the DAS to compare dysfunctional cognition during neutral 
mood and sad mood provided support for the DAH. During neutral mood, recovered 
depressed patients did not differ from controls (not vulnerable to depression) on 
dysfunctional cognitions, as predicted by the DAH. In contrast, following a sad mood 
induction, recovered depressed patients displayed elevated dysfunctional cognitions when 
compared to controls (Miranda & Persons, 1988), also as predicted by the DAH. Therefore, 
evidence supporting the DAH, indicates negative cognitive processing and maladaptive 
thinking patterns are activated by a depressive emotional state which results in cognitive 
vulnerability to depression.  
Using Teasdales DAH, cognitive theorists have argued, the phenomenon of cognitive 
reactivity is able to account for the onset of depression even when here is no causal event 
(Segal et al., 2002; Segal, Williams, Teasdale, & Gemar, 1996). Teasdale (1988) had 
proposed there is a reciprocal relationship between depression and cognitive processing that 
results in a potential positive feedback mechanism. With each depressive episode, 





and cognitive process can reinforce each other and are able to trigger a depressive episode 
even in the absence of external triggers or immediate environmental inputs (Fennell, 
Teasdale, Jones, & Damlé, 1987; Segal et al., 2002; Segal et al., 1996).  
Explicit Measures.  
Since Becks cognitive model and Teasdale’s DAH, numerous self-report measures of 
explicit cognitive reactivity have been developed. It is important to ensure the measurements 
are able to measure the subtle aspects of cognitive reactivity.  The aforementioned DAS 
(Weissman, & Beck, 1978) was one of the first self-report measures of dysfunctional 
cognition. Although it has provided support for cognitive reactivity it is dependent upon a 
mood induction procedure. The process requires participants to complete the DAS 
questionnaire prior to and following a sad mood induction procedure (Moulds et al., 2008). 
The standard mood induction procedure requires the participants to listen to a sad piece of 
music while recalling a sad autobiographical memory. This procedure has proven to be 
effective in generating a sad mood within a large number of individuals (Clarke & Teasdale, 
1985 see, Ingram, & Segal, 2005 for reviews). Unfortunately, this procedure is time-
consuming and requires repeated administration of the DAS questionnaire. 
To address the perceived difficulties of the DAS, Van der Does (2002) developed the 
Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS). The LEIDS is an alternative time-effective 
self-report measure of cognitive reactivity in those with a history of depression. It is a 
validated self-report measure to index cognitive reactivity, that can be used by both clinicians 
and researchers. The LEIDS questionnaire comprises of 26 items across four factors 
(Negative Self-Evaluation, Acceptance/Coping, Indifference, and Risk Aversion) (Van der 
Does, 2002). Studies comparing recovered depressed and never depressed participants 





der Does, 2005). In particular, recovered depressed individuals displayed higher LEIDS 
scores then never depressed individuals (Von der Does, 2005).  
Explicit self-report measures reply on the participants’ ability to respond honestly and 
accurately for all items on the questionnaire. This results in self-report measures having two 
inherent limitations. Firstly, self-report measures are commonly associated with socially 
desirable responding (Paulhus, 2002). This is when participants provide responses based on 
what is socially acceptable or desirable rather than what they actually believe. Socially 
desirable responding commonly results in participants enhancing positive qualities (e.g., I am 
kind) and denying negative qualities (e.g., I am mean; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Therefore, a 
consequence of socially desirable responding is inaccurate representations of the concept 
being measure and biases the results. A second limitation, is the participants’ ability to 
recognise the construct or processes being measured. For example, the DAS and LEIDS 
questionnaires rely on participates to engage in introspection to accurately respond about 
their cognitive processes in order understand the relationship between cognition and 
depression. Social cognitive researchers have argued that some participants are unable to 
correctly identify higher cognitive processes that influence their behaviours and responses 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1997). Therefore, if the participants are unable to engage in introspection, 
then their responses will not be true reflections of the constructs being measured (e.g., the 
relationship between cognition and depression). An alternative to explicit self-report 
measures are implicit measurement procedures.  
Implicit Measurement Procedure 
 The development and application of implicit measures have been deemed a significant 
achievement for psychological science because of their ability to assess mental 
representations (Le Bel & Paunonen, 2011). There are varying opinions about what defines a 





construct (e.g., attitude, beliefs) under conditions of automaticity (e.g., participants have little 
time to response, participants are unaware of the construct being measured, do not explicitly 
intend to express the construct being measured; see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, 
& Moors, 2009; De Houwer & Moors, 2012). Implicit measures were originally developed to 
study attitudes and beliefs. However, research has suggested these measures could be used to 
investigate psychopathological processes (De Houwer, 2002; Wiers, Teachman & De 
Houwer, 2007). Therefore, implicit measures provide the ability to investigate processes and 
constructs outside of conscious awareness and susceptible to social influences, which explicit 
measures are unable to do.   
In general, implicit measures require participants to respond as quickly as possible to 
the stimuli presented on the screen using two response options. Instead of calculating the 
participants scores on explicit self-report measures, implicit measures analyse the ease or 
difficulty (e.g., reaction time in milliseconds) in which participants respond to the stimuli.  
The validity of implicit measures has often been questioned (LeBel & Paunonen, 
2011) because results found on implicit measures do not always correlate with explicit 
measures (Roefs et al., 2011). One explanation for this differences may be due to differences 
in methodology between implicit and explicit measures (O’Reilly, Roche, & Cartwright, 
2014). However, others argue that implicit measures are able to assess and measure 
constructs that explicit measures are unable to (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & 
Boles, 2010). Implicit measures arguably capture attitudes, beliefs or actions that are 
favourably or unfavourably mediate by past experiences (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
Implicit measures have been utilised to provide support for cognitive theories of 
depression (Clarke, et al., 1999) that explicit measures were unable to. For instance, cognitive 
theories of depression have predicted there will be an interaction between stressful life events 





to detect this interaction when comparing remitted depressed individuals to controls, when 
explicit measures were unable to (De Readts, Schacht, Frank, & De Houwer, 2006; Gemar, 
Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001). Below I will discuss three types of implicit measures and 
its utility in depression research.  
 Implicit Association Task  
The Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) and its 
variants (see Roefs et al., 2011 for review) are a commonly used implicit measure to support 
cognitive theories of depression. The IAT presents one word at a time and participants are 
instructed to sort the stimuli into categories (e.g., the word ‘good’ would be sorted into the 
category of stimuli labelled ‘I am’). The words are commonly evaluative (e.g., good, bad) 
and are related to the attitude or belief being measured (e.g., self-esteem, political belief, 
attitudes).  
For example, if the IAT was measuring the belief ‘I am good’ the categories will be 
labelled, ‘self’ and ‘other’. The IAT will measure the response latencies in two critical trial 
blocks (an example is illustrated in Figure 1). During the first block, one response option 
indicates the category ‘I am’ and positive evaluative words. The other response option 
indicates the category ‘I am not’ and negative evaluative words. During the second block the 
evaluative words are swapped. One response option indicates the category ‘self’ and negative 
evaluative words. The other response option indicates the category ‘other’ and positive 
evaluative words. The difference between the mean response latencies of the blocks is 
presumed to indicate which category is evaluated more positively or negatively. For this 
example, if participants respond faster during block one than block two, then it is presumed 






Figure 1. Two sample screen presentations of an IAT investigating self-associations. 
Initially the IAT was developed to measure the association between two pairs of 
stimuli. However, it has been adapted to measure more complex implicit stimuli such as, self-
esteem and self-concept (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The IAT is a widely used implicit 
measure because of its ability to be adapted to significantly assess a broad variety of 
associations (see, Greenwald & Nosek, 2001 for an overview), it has low attrition rates 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Roefs et al., 2011) and has successfully been used within a variety of 
populations (see Nosek, Greenwald &Banaji, 2007 for review). Despite the success of the 
IAT it has one major limitation. The IAT is designed to capture individuals’ beliefs or 
attitudes based on associations between concepts (e.g., ‘self’ and ‘good’ or ‘self’ and ‘bad’). 
However, it is unable to identify the way these concepts are related (see, Hughes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Vahey, 2012 for a detailed overview). For instance, an IAT measuring self-esteem 
would assess the belief ‘I like myself’. Therefore, correct responses depend on the presence 
of specific stimuli (e.g., ‘I’, ‘like’, or ‘myself’) rather than how they are related (e.g., ‘I like 
myself’ or ‘I want to like myself’). Despite this limitation, the IAT has provided evidence 
that formally depressed individuals display different implicit beliefs and attitudes than non-
depressed individuals and mood effects can exacerbate these differences (Gemar et al., 2001; 







Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010) is 
an implicit measure that targets ‘brief and immediate’ relational responses. The IRAP 
emerged from Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), 
which is a behavioural account of human language and cognition based on relational 
responding. According to RFT people respond to events or stimuli in certain ways depending 
on its relation to other events or stimuli. For example, when someone is asked “How are 
you?” their response will depend on who asked the question or the context it was asked in 
(e.g., Doctor, co-worker, therapy session). The IRAP has been designed to assess the 
relational responding defined by RFT and it provides the ability to differentiate between 
beliefs that differ only by the relational component (e.g., ‘I am good’ vs. ‘I want to be good’; 
see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010 for an overview). The IRAP is able to identify this 
differentiation because correct response depends on the relation between the stimuli (e.g., the 
statement ‘I am good’ or ‘I want to be good’). 
The IRAP presents a target word or phrase at the top of the screen and an evaluative 
word is presented in the centre of the screen. Two response options are presented in the lower 
corners of the screen and varies across trials. The participants are asked to quickly and 
accurately relate the target word or phrase with the evaluative word based on a responding 
rule. For example, if the IRAP is measuring the belief ‘I am good’, the phrase ‘I am’ or ‘I am 
not’ will appear at the top of the screen and an evaluative word will appear in the centre of 
the screen (e.g., good, bad). This results in four different trial types (e.g., I am + positive 
word, I am + negative word, I am not + positive word and I am not + negative word). Like 
the IAT, the IRAP compares the participants’ performance between two critical trial blocks 
(an example is illustrated in Figure 2). During the first blocks participants are instructed to 





trials are inconsistent with the belief. During the second block participants are instructed to 
select ‘correct’ when the trials are inconsistent with the belief, and select ‘incorrect’ when the 
trials are consistent with the belief. Difference in performance (e.g., response time), between 
the trial blocks is presumed to indicate the strength of the relational response being measured. 
For this example, if participants’ response faster during block one than block two, its 
presumed the participants hold a stronger belief ‘I am good’ (relative to ‘I am bad’). 
 
Figure 2. Four sample screen presentations of an IRAP investigating the belief 'I am good' in 
relation to the belief 'I am not good'. The 'consistent' and 'inconsistent' labels represent the 
pre-experimentally established responding rules. The bracted text and arrows are included for 
illustration and does not appear to participants. 
The IRAP has shown to be a valid measure in identifying differences in participants’ 
cognition and cognitive processes, and these differential effects cannot be easily faked 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007). 
The Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model is often used to explain the effects 
of the IRAP as behavioural events that may occur publically or privately (see Barnes-Holmes 





explain the divergence between implicit and explicit measures (see, Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010 for an overview). 
Previous research has shown depressed and non-depressed individuals are likely to 
display differential responding on the IRAP. These differences provide support for cognitive 
theories, because depressed individuals are likely to display responses that are indicative of 
dysfunctional attitudes and beliefs (Beck et al., 1979; Teasdale, 1988, Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010). For instance, depressed individuals display a response bias towards negative future 
thinking whereas non-depressed individuals display a response bias towards positive future 
thinking (Kosnes, Whelan, O’Donovan, & McHugh, 2013). 
Previous IRAP research in depression has predominantly focused on self-associations 
(De Raedt et al., 2006). Studies measuring implicit self-esteem and self-worth have shown 
that depressed and remitted depressed individuals display differences to non-depressed 
individuals, by favouring negative and dysfunctional attitudes or beliefs (De Raedt et al., 
2006; Frank, De Raedt, Dereu, & Van den Abbeele, 2006). 
A recent study by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), used the IRAP as an implicit 
measure of cognitive reactivity and psychological flexibility to explore the relationship 
between mood state dependent effects and vulnerability to depression. This was a novel study 
because it examined emotional reactions to events rather than self-associations. The results 
showed that depressive individuals were more susceptible to mood state dependent effects 
than non-depressive individuals. Depressive individuals’ performance on the IRAP post-
mood induction is commonly referred to as cognitive reactivity, the activation of negative 
thinking patterns by low mood (Lau et al., 2004). Performance on the IRAP also indicates 
depressive individuals display psychological inflexibility whereas non-depressive individuals 
display psychological flexibility. Psychological flexibility refers to participants’ experiencing 





inflexibility refers to participants’ experiencing undesirable thoughts and feelings and not 
being able respond in a congruent manner (Bond et al., 2011). This study is important 
because it provides initial evidence that implicit measures are able to detect mood effects 
such as cognitive reactivity and psychological flexibility. 
Although the IRAP has been successfully implemented within a variety of context 
(see, Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013 for reviews), it contains 
certain limitations that constrains it utility. The IRAP is often difficult to complete because 
the responding options assigned to the keyboard keys typically varies from trial to trial (De 
Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roets, & Hughes., 2015). The difficulty of the IRAP is often 
associated with higher attrition rates and constrains its utility within certain populations 
(Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & DenRaedt, 2013; see Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013 for an overview). The next implicit measure, was developed in 
response to these limitations and limitations of the IAT. 
Relational Responding Task 
The Relational Responding Task (RRT; De Houwer et al., 2015) is a novel implicit 
measurement procedure, that was developed upon the IRAP and IAT. For this study, the RRT 
was selected as a novel implicit measurement procedure because it is arguably a better 
implicit measurement procedure than the IRAP (see De Houwer et al., 2015 for review). Both 
the IRAP and RRT are measures designed to assess beliefs as they are represented in 
relatively cognitively inaccessible and non-conscious ways, by having participants select 
correct responses based on the relation between different stimuli (e.g., the statement “I am 
good”) rather than just the presence of specific stimuli (e.g., “I”, “am”, or “good”) (De 
Houwer et al., 2015). Like the IRAP this provides RRT with the potential to identify 
individual beliefs that differ with regard to the relational component (for an overview, see 





response time to difference statements, using response time as an index of the accessibility of 
non-conscious cognitive propositions (De Houwer et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the RRT retains the central aspect of the IRAP, specifically having 
participants respond in-line with the beliefs being measured. However, it differs in, 
presentation of stimuli, nature of instructions and task structure (De Houwer et al., 2015). The 
RRT presents stimuli as full statements displayed in the centre of the computer screen (e.g., 
“I am good” or “I am not good”); and the participants are presented with explicit instructions 
to respond “as if” they agree with statements that are consistent with a belief (e.g., “I am 
good”) and disagree with inconsistent statements (De Houwer, et al., 2015). As an example, 
during one block participants might be asked to respond as if they like animals by selecting 
‘true’ when presented with statements that are consistent with this belief (e.g., “I like dogs”) 
and selecting ‘false’ when presented with statements that are inconsistent with this belief 
(e.g., “I hate dogs”). Then in a second block, the participants would be asked to respond as if 
they hate animals by selecting ‘true’ when presented with statements consistent with this 
belief (e.g., “I hate dogs”) and selecting ‘false’ when presented with statements inconsistent 
with this belief (e.g., “I like dogs”). De Houwer et al., (2015) argues the difference in 
response time between these two blocks is presumed to be a measure of the extent the 
participants hold the belief “I like animals” (relative to “I hate animals”).  
The responding key for true and false remains constant throughout the entire RRT 
procedure. For instance, on every trial selecting one key (e.g., press the letter ‘I’) provides the 
‘true’ response, whereas selecting another key (e.g., press the letter ‘E’) provides the ‘false’ 
response. To discourage changing the response key throughout the RRT, De Houwer et al., 
(2015) included inducer trials. The inducer trials are stimuli that refer to concepts of ‘true’ or 
‘false’ (e.g., correct, wrong, accurate, or inaccuate). For instance, when participants are 





press ‘E’) and when they are presented with stimuli consistent with the concept ‘false’ they 
are instructed to press another key (e.g., press ‘I’; De Houwer, et al., 2015).  
As a result of including the inducer trials, the task structure of the RRT differed from 
the IRAP but closely resembled that of the IAT, “four categories of stimuli are assigned to 
two responses in a way that varies across blocks” (De Houwer et al., 2015, p. 3). As a result 
of the structural similarities, De Hower et al., (2015) believe RRT will display the same 
success as the IAT by being easier than the IRAP to administer, have low attrition rates and 
have an ability to be administered on a large scale via the internet as well as to a variety of 
populations. These claims are promising, however, there is very little empirical support to 
validate that RRT is superior to IRAP. The study by De Houwer et al., (2015) has shown the 
RRT to be easier and faster to administer than IRAP and had low attrition rates.  
Since the RRT has been developed recently there are very few published studies. 
However, like the IRAP the RRT has been developed to measure beliefs such as self-
associations and racial beliefs. Therefore, the RRT should be able to utilised in the same way 
the IRAP has been used in previous research. To my knowledge there is currently no RRT 
research focused on implicit cognition within depression. Due to lack of RRT research within 
this area, this study should be seen as a proof of concept study, that explores the utility of the 
RRT in the detection of cognitive reactivity within a normative population. 
The Current Study 
The current study aims to examine the utility of the RRT as an implicit measure of 
cognitive reactivity, by replicating the aforementioned study of Hussey and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012).  
As previously mentioned, the RRT and IRAP are similar in measuring relational 
responding, however they differ in the presentation of stimuli, nature of instructions and task 





developed by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) to ensure the RRT continues to “target both 
positive and depressive emotional reactions to positive and depressing events” (p. 575). Due 
to the differences between the IRAP and RRT the original stimuli had to be adapted to meet 
the structure of the RRT. The original set of IRAP stimuli was developed as statements that 
take the form of a positive or negative antecedent, followed by a positive or negative 
emotional responses, which follow the general formula “When X happens … I feel Y” 
(Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). Each statement was developed to correspond with the 
depression subscales from the Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond and 
Lovibond, 1993). Therefore, Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) IRAP stimuli consisted of 32 
statements that corresponded with all seven depression subscales. Due to the technical 
limitations of the RRT, the original 32 statements were reduced to 20 statements that 
corresponded with five of the depression subscales. I removed the extra statements 
corresponding with ‘dysphoria’ because they were originally added to ensure the technical 
limitations of the IRAP were met. I also removed the statements corresponding with 
‘devaluation of life’ and ‘inertia’ because the positive and negative responses were the least 
consistent with the formula “I feel Y” (see Hussey and Barnes-Holmes, 2012). This resulted 
in the remaining 20 statements corresponding with the depression subscales, dysphoria, 
hopelessness, self-depreciation, lack of interest/involvement and anhedonia (see Table 1). 
The RRT measured the participants’ reaction time (as time in millisecond) to identify 
if they were faster at responding to antecedent-affect congruent stimuli (e.g., “When good 
things happen I feel happy” or “When bad things happen I feel sad”) or antecedent-affect 
incongruent stimuli (e.g., “When good things happen I feel sad” or “When bad things happen 
I feel happy”). Two explicit responding rules had to be developed for the RRT to reflect the 
differential rates of responding. For the purpose of this study, the antecedent-affect congruent 





positive events and negative reactions to negative events’, whereas the antecedent-affect 
incongruent responding rule requires the participants to ‘response as if they have negative 
reactions to positive events and positive reactions to negative events’.  
The structure of the RRT is consistent with De Houwer et al., (2015), it involves both 
target trials and inducer trials that are presented across three trial blocks and two test blocks. 
The target trials involve the presentation of the statements that were either antecedent-affect 
congruent or antecedent-affect incongruent. The inducer trials involved the presentation of 
the synonyms of true and false used by De Houwer et al., (2015). The three practice blocks 
that contain either inducer or target trials only to teach the participants the responding rules. 
The two test blocks contain both inducer and target trials. In the first test block, participants 
were asked to respond to target trials based on the antecedent-affect congruent responding 
rule. In the second test block, participants were asked to respond to the target trials based on 
the antecedent-affect incongruent responding rule. The differences in average response time 
between the two test blocks will measure the extent the participants hold an emotional bias to 
antecedent-affect congruent stimuli (relative to the antecedent-affect incongruent stimuli). 
The participants were screened using the DASS to ensure the sample was similar to 
Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). The DASS was originally selected to screen participants 
because it provides the possibility to check depressive symptomology rather than 
psychopathology generally (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). With reference to the 
classification system defined in the DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) the participants 
were classified into ‘normal’ or ‘mild-moderate’ depressive groups. These groups represented 
high and low extremes of normative levels of depressive symptoms. Individuals with more 
extreme depression symptoms were screened out of the sample. 
The design of the current study replicated Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) and 





Gemar et al., 2001). Participants were assessed using the RRT before and after an 
experimentally induced sad mood state. The mood induction was conducted using the 
standard Musical and Autobiographical Recall Mood Induction Procedure (see Scher, 
Ingram, & Segal, 2005 for review). The participants were required to listen to a piece of sad 
music and recall a personal memory to induce the sad mood. Hussey and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012), selected the mood induction procedure because it has effectively induced positive and 
negative mood in majority of individuals (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, & Luciano, 2004; Cahill et al., 2007). The general hypothesis is the 
individuals characterised as normal and mild-moderate depressive will show the same 
differential reaction to the mood induction procedure as Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). 
Specifically, I predict: 
 Prior to the mood induction both the normal and mild-moderate depressive groups 
will respond faster to antecedent-affect congruent stimuli than antecedent-affect 
incongruent stimuli. 
 Post-mood induction, the normal group will continue to respond faster to antecedent-
affect congruent stimuli, whereas, the mild-moderate depressive group will respond 
faster to antecedent-affect incongruent stimuli. 
The IRAP was used by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) as a functional approach to 
measure implicit cognition. The RRT will take the same approach. Hussey and Barnes-
Holmes (2012) specified the concept of depression was not functional because it relied on 
syndromal classification, therefore they included an explicit measure that defines 
psychopathology functionally. Psychological flexibility has been identified as a core 
functional component within depression and other psychopathologies (Bond et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011) was 





with depression to explore the relationship between this concept and performance on the 
IRAP (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). The original study differentiated the participants 
into high and low psychological flexibility groups. The results indicated that the two groups 
displayed differential reactions to the mood induction procedure that were similar to the 
depressive groups. As this study is replicating Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) the AAQ-II 
(Bond et al., 2011a) was also included in the current study as a functional measure of 
psychological flexibility. This is to examine the relationship between this concept and 
performance on the RRT. I hypothesised that individuals’ characterised as having either high 
or low psychological flexibility on the AAQ-II will show the same differential reaction to the 
mood induction procedure as Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). Specifically, I predict: 
 The high psychological flexibility group will show similar effects as the normal 
depressive group whereas the low psychological flexibility group will show similar 
effects as the mild-moderate depressive groups.  
 Prior to the mood induction procedure, both the high and low psychological 
flexibility groups will respond faster to antecedent-affect congruent stimuli than 
antecedent-affect incongruent stimuli.  
 Post-mood induction, the high psychological flexibility group will respond faster to 
antecedent-affect congruent stimuli. Whereas the low psychological flexibility group 
will respond faster to antecedent-affect incongruent stimuli.  
To expand upon Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), the current study has included the 
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The RRQ has 
been included because it measures the concept ‘rumination’ which has been established as a 
factor associated with the recurrence of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Previous 
research has shown that rumination is susceptible to mood-state dependent effects (Moulds et 





(Lo, Ho & Hollon, 2007). Therefore, the current study will use the RRQ to explore the 
relationship between rumination and performance on the RRT. I have hypothesised 
individuals characterised as high and low rumination will show differential reaction to the 
mood induction procedure. Specifically, I predict: 
 The low rumination group will show similar effects as the normal depressive group 
whereas the high rumination group will show similar effects as the mild-moderate 
depressive groups. 
 Prior to the mood induction procedure, both the high and low rumination groups will 
respond faster to antecedent-affect congruent stimuli than antecedent-affect 
incongruent stimuli. 
 Post-mood induction, the low rumination group will respond faster to antecedent-
affect congruent stimuli. Whereas the high rumination group will respond faster to 
antecedent-affect incongruent stimuli.  
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 22 undergraduate participants were recruited from the University of 
Canterbury Department of Psychology participant pool, in which students were provided with 
course credit as an incentive for participating. The potential participants were screened with 
the DASS-21 (see below; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) and those selected for further 
participation represented the high and low end respectively of normative levels of depressive 
symptoms. Participants who scored as ‘normal’ (depression scores ≤ 9) represented low 
normative levels of depressive symptoms and those who scored as ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’ 
(depression scores 10 ≤ 20) represented high normative levels of depression. Participants who 
scored as “severe” or “extremely severe” on the DASS-21 for the depressive, anxious or 





scores from Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) were removed from the respective analyses for 
ethical reasons. Hereafter those participants scoring in the high normal range are referred to 
as ‘mild-moderate’ depressive group (but in a non-clinical sense), while the rest were the 
‘normal’ group. 
Based on their adjusted DASS-21 scores, 17 undergraduate participants were selected 
and completed the experimental phases of the current study and consisted of 4 males and 13 
females aged 18 to 31 (M = 21, SD = 4). From this sample, 6% identified as Māori, 82% 
identified as New Zealand European / Pākehā and the remaining 12% identified as Asian. As 
noted above they were further divided into two groups to represent mild-moderate and 
normal levels of depressive symptoms. The ‘normal’ group consisted of participants who 
scored within the ‘normal’ depressive range (score = ≤ 9, M = 4.22, SD = 2.73), and the 
‘mild/moderate’ group consisted of participants who scored within either the ‘mild’ or 
‘moderate’ depressive range (score = 10 ≤ 20, M = 17.25, SD = 3.20). Participants depressive 
DASS scores are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1  
Scores Obtained from the DASS Depression Scale, Including the Cut-off Scores Used to 
Divide Groups. 
 Depression 
 Cut-off score n M (SD) 
Normal 0 – 9 9 4.22 (2.73) 
Mild/ moderate 10 - 20 8 17.25 (3.20) 
 
Apparatus  
The experimental procedure was administered using E-Prime (version: 2.0.10.356) on 
a Cyclone branded computer (Intel Core i7-2600, 3.4 Ghz processor, 8GB of RAM), running 
64-bit Windows 7 enterprise edition. A Phillips Brilliance 241B monitor (24 inch diagonal, 
LED backlight, 1920 x 1080 resolution) positioned at eye level presented the experimental 





excepts were delivered using Genius HS-04SU headset with microphones (headband stereo 
headset, In-line volume control, 3.5mm jack plug). 
The sessions were conducted in a small, quiet, dimly lit, temperature-controlled room 
at the University of Canterbury. The room contained three computers, for groups of 
participants to complete the experimental procedure. Each participant was individually seated 
at a computer that was partitioned for privacy to allow for each participant to complete the 
experimental procedure confidentially at their own pace.  
Measures 
Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). This is 
a shortened version of the DASS-42 and consists of 21 items constituting three self-report 
subscales for depressive, anxious and stress symptoms. Each scale contains 7 items rated on a 
4-point Likert scale; 0 = Did not apply to me at all to 3 = Applied to me very much, or most of 
the time. Participants rate the extent each statement has applied to them in the previous week. 
All items relevant to the subscale are summed and multiplied by two to make them congruent 
with those obtained on the DASS-42 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), with scores ranging 
from 0 – 42. The Depression scale assesses dysphoria, hopelessness, devaluation of life, self-
deprecation, lack of interest/involvement, anhedonia and inertia with items such as: “I felt I 
wasn’t worth much as a person”. Scores within the range 0-9 are categorised as ‘normal’ 
depressive symptoms, scores within the range 10-20 are categorised as mild-moderate 
depressive symptoms and scores ≥21 indicated severe/extremely severe depressive 
symptoms. As noted above, those with scores ≥21 have been excluded from the study. The 
alpha reliability coefficients for the DASS-21 subscales have been examined in clinical and 
community samples and reported as .94 for depression, .87 for anxiety and .91 for stress 





was high for the depression (Cronbach’s α = .78) and stress (Cronbach’s α = .65) subscales, 
however it was low for the anxiety subscale (Cronbach’s α = .01).  
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011a). The 7-item 
version of the AAQ-II was included as an exploratory measure of psychological inflexibility / 
experiential avoidance. Participants rated the extent each statement is true to them (e.g., “I’m 
afraid of my feelings”) on a 7-point Likert scale; 1 = never true to 7 = always true. All of the 
items are then summed with totals ranging from 7 to 49; low scores indicate greater levels of 
psychological flexibility and higher scores indicate greater levels of psychological 
inflexibility. The alpha reliability coefficient for the AAQ-II has been examined in both 
clinical and community samples and reported a mean alpha coefficient of .84 (Bond et al., 
2011a). Internal consistency for the current sample was high (Cronbach’s α = .81).  
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The 
RRQ utilises 24 items across two self-report scales, namely Rumination and Reflection. The 
RRQ has been included as an additional exploratory measure of psychological flexibility 
using the rumination scale. The rumination scale consists of 12-items that assess ruminative 
self-focus, i.e., “self-attentiveness motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the 
self”, whereas the reflection scale contains 12-items that assesses adaptive self-curiosity and 
reflective thinking, i.e., “self-attentiveness motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the 
self” (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, p. 297). Participants rate the extent they agree or disagree 
with each statement (e.g., “sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself”) on 
a 5-point Likert scale using 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The scores for 
reflection and rumination are calculated by summing the total scores for the relevant items 
including the reversed items, with higher scores indicating higher levels of rumination and 
reflection; total scores range from 12-60. The alpha reliability coefficients for the RRQ 





and .91 for reflection. Internal consistency for the current sample was high for both the 
rumination (Cronbach’s α = .87) and reflection subscale (Cronbach’s α = .88)  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988). 
The PANAS consists of 20-items that are divided equally over two affect scales: positive 
affect and negative affect. The PANAS was used as a measure of the participants’ mood at 
the moment in time when they completed the experiment (i.e., as a manipulation check for 
the mood induction). To complete the PANAS, participants rated the extent each word 
described their feeling at the present moment on a 5-point Likert scale; 1 = very slightly or 
not at all to 5 = extremely. The PANAS positive and negative affect scores are calculated by 
summing all of the relevant items, with total scores ranging from 10 – 50. Higher scores on 
the positive affect scale reflect higher levels of positive affect, whereas lower scores on the 
negative affect scale reflect lower levels of negative affect. The alpha reliability coefficients 
for the PANAS subscales have been examined by Watson, Clark & Tellegan (1988). For the 
Positive Affect scale the Cronbach alpha coefficient range from .86 to .90 and the Negative 
Affect scale ranged from .84 to .87. Internal consistency with the current sample was high for 
both the positive affect (Cronbach’s α = .89) and negative affect (Cronbach’s α = .89) 
subscales.  
Procedure 
Mood Induction and Relational Responding Task Procedure 
Mood Induction Procedure. The musical and autobiographical recall mood induction 
procedure is the standard procedure used to study mood state dependent effects (Hussey & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2015; see Scher, Ingram & Segal, 2005, for review). The participants were 
provided with written instructions describing how to induce either a sad mood or a positive 
mood before being presented with the musical excerpts. To induce either a sad mood or a 





minutes and presented to participants using the E-Prime software, at a volume that was 
reported as comfortable and clearly audible by participants.  The musical except: Albinoni’s 
“Adagio in G Minor” was utilised during the sad mood induction procedure. The musical 
except: Mozart’s “Divertiento 136” was utilised during the positive mood induction 
procedure.  
Relational Responding Task. (RRT; De Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roet, & Hughes, 
2015). The RRT procedure presented all of the instructions, stimuli and recorded all of the 
participants’ responses via computer monitor and keyboard. The RRT stimuli incorporates 
ten inducer words and twenty target statements presented throughout five blocks of trials. The 
ten inducer words consist of five synonyms of true and five synonyms of false (see Table 2). 
The twenty statements took the form of positive and negative antecedent- affect congruent or 
incongruent that followed the general formula “When X happens … I feel Y”. The statements 
were extracted from the original set of stimuli developed for an IRAP procedure (Hussey & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2012). The original set of stimuli statements were derived from the DASS 
model of depressive symptoms (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) using the seven subscales: 
dysphoria, hopelessness, devaluation of life, self-deprecation, lack of interest/involvement, 
anhedonia and inertia. Therefore, the original set of IRAP stimuli contained 32 statements. 
The RRT procedure requires only twenty stimuli, therefore due to technical limitations the 
original seven subscale statements have been reduced to five which reflect the depression 
DASS subscales: dysphoria, hopelessness, self-deprecation, lack of interest/involvement and 
anhedonia. The antecedent-affect statements and their corresponding DASS subscales are 






Table 2  
The Stimuli Employed in the RRT, Organized by Label and Target Type. Extracted from the 
Study by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) 
Positive Antecedents Negative Antecedents Corresponding DASS subscale 
When things go well When things go badly Dysphoria 
When I’m successful When I fail Hopelessness 
When people praise me When people criticize me Self-Depreciation 
When I get involved When I do nothing Lack of interest/involvement 
When good things happen When bad things happen Anhedonia 
Positive Responses Negative Responses  
I feel happy I feel sad Dysphoria 
I feel positive I feel hopeless Hopelessness 
I feel worthwhile  I feel worthless Self-Depreciation 
I feel enthusiastic I feel uninterested Lack of interest/involvement 
I enjoy life I can’t enjoy life Anhedonia 
Response Option 1: Response Option 2:  
TRUE FALSE  
Positive Inducer words Negative inducer words  
True False  
Correct Incorrect  
Right Wrong  
Accurate Inaccurate  
Confirm Untrue  
 
Experimental Procedure 
The participants were welcomed to the session and seated at a computer, then each 
one was assigned a number to preserve their confidentiality and asked to read the information 
form (Appendix A). The information sheet explained the purpose of the study as replicating 
the original study of Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) by using the RRT as a novel implicit 
measure of a particular psychopathology and levels of psychological flexibility during a 
mood induction procedure, and that all of their answers would be recorded. The participants 





stage without penalty. Any questions were answered by the experimenter and once satisfied 
the participants signed the consent form (Appendix B). They then completed a short 
demographic form which asked for their: age, gender and country of birth and then completed 
the experimental procedure.  
The experimental procedure replicated the procedure used in the study of Hussey and 
Barnes-Holmes (2012) and was divided into three phases (a) baseline measurement prior to 
mood induction, (b) sad mood induction, and (c) measurement post-mood induction. 
Phase 1: Baseline Measurement.  
Participants first completed the DASS-21, AAQ-II, RRQ and PANAS questionnaires. 
They were then introduced to the RRT program which presents instructions that describe the 
stimuli used for the trial blocks and method of response. They were informed they will be 
presented with either words in orange that are synonyms of true and false or statements in 
blue of situations and associated emotional response which follows the general formula 
“When X happens … I feel Y” (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). Based on responding rule 
given before each trial block, participants were asked to respond to the stimuli as either “true” 
(by pressing the right control key) or “false” (by pressing the left control key) as quickly and 
accurately as possible.  
The order of the trials for each block were random, however no words or statements 
were presented on two consecutive trials. Each trial begun with the presentation of a word or 
statement in the centre of the screen and it remained until the correct response to the rule was 
registered. Any incorrect responses were followed by the presentation of a red cross which 
remained on screen until the correct response was provided. The next trial started 750ms after 
a correct response was produced. The statements presented to participants belong to one of 
four different trials types: (a) positive antecedents with congruent affect responses, (b) 





incongruent affect responses and (d) negative antecedents with congruent affect responses 
(see Figure 3; Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). The RRT procedure consisted of three 
practice blocks and two test blocks.  
The first block contained 40 trials where each of the 10 inducer words were presented 
4 times as practice. Participants were asked to categorise the words presented on the screen as 
either synonyms of “true” (by pressing the right control key) or “false” (press the left control 
key).  The second block contained 40 trials, where 20 target statements were presented twice 
and were asked to respond if the statement on the screen was “true” or “false” based on the 
rule: respond as if you have positive reactions to positive events and negative reactions to 
negative events. The third block contained 60 trials. 20 target statements were presented once 
and the 10 inducer words were presented twice in two consecutive repetitions and were asked 
to respond to the stimuli in accordance with the rules practiced in the preceding two blocks. 
The fourth block was identical to block two, however the responding rule for each statement 
changed and were asked to respond to the statements as “true” or “false” based on the 
reversed rule: respond as if you have negative reactions to positive events and positive 
reactions to negative events. The fifth and final block was identical to the third block, 
however participants are asked to respond to the target statements in accordance with the rule 
learnt in the previous block; However, they were asked to continue responding to the inducer 
words in accordance with the previous trials because this rule did not change.  
Phase 2: Sad Mood Induction.  
An adaption of the musical ad autobiographical recall mood induction procedure used 
by Hussey & Barnes-Holmes (2012) and Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, & 
Luciano (2004) was used to establish a sad mood. The following instructions used in the 
previous studies were presented on screen for the participants to read before listening to the 





“You will now be asked to listen to a piece of classical music. This section of music 
should help you to develop a sad mood. However, music alone cannot create the 
desired mood, so you should try to think about something that makes you sad. You 
may find it especially useful to concentrate on sad events that you have personally 
experienced.” 
Once the participants indicated they had read the instructions, they were provided 
with a set of headphones which played the sad musical excerpt which was Albinoni’s – 
Adagio in G Minor.  
Phase 3: Measurement.  
Once the mood induction procedure was completed, they then completed the PANAS 
as an explicit measure of mood. The participants then completed the RRT procedure for a 
second time. This includes the practice blocks and the test blocks. To mediate any negative 
mood as a result of the sad mood induction procedure, then they completed a second musical 
and autobiographical recall mood induction procedure to establish a positive mood. To 
induce a positive mood, the participants were presented with the following instructions on the 
screen:  
“You will now be asked to listen to a piece of classical music. This section of music 
should help you to develop a happy mood. However, music alone cannot create the 
desired mood, so you should try to think about something that makes you happy. You 
may find it especially useful to concentrate on happy events that you have personally 
experienced.” 
Once the participants had indicated they had read the instructions, they used the 
headphones that were previously provided, which played the positive musical excerpt, which 
was, Mozart’s – Divertimento 136. Once the positive mood induction procedure was 





form explained the purpose of the study and provided contact information for support 
services in case the participants experienced any adverse feelings as a result of participating 
in the study. They were then thanked for their participation and released from the session, and 
receive course credit for participating.  
 
Figure 3. Examples of the four RRT trial types. Bracketed text and arrows are included for 
illustration and did not appear to participants in the actual RRT. The top two rows have 
arrows which indicate the correct response for the rule in block two and three. The bottom 







RRT Data Preparation 
The data produced by the RRT program were raw latency scores (i.e., their response 
time) from each participant’s trials, defined as the time in milliseconds between the 
presentation of the stimulus and the emission of the correct response. In accordance with 
recent RRT research (De Houwer et al., 2015), only the target statements from the test blocks 
were analysed by transforming the raw latency scores using the same improved D-algorithm 
(D1) utilised by De Houwer et al., (2015), which Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) 
developed for the IAT. The D1 algorithm was selected because the RRT procedure records 
the reaction time until the correct response is emitted, therefore it does penalise incorrect 
responses on trials as other algorithms do (see Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji, 2003 for 
review). For the purpose of this study the transformed raw latency scores are referred to as 
‘DRRT scores’. Table 3 shows the D1 algorithm steps involved in transforming the raw 
latencies into DRRT scores. To put it simply, the DRRT score is a measure of difference in 
response latencies between the antecedent-affect congruent trial block and the antecedent-
affect incongruent trial block and the overall DRRT scores are calculated as either positive or 
negative scores.  
In summary, the overall positive DRRT scores indicate faster correct antecedent-affect 
congruent responses than incongruent responses. Therefore, participants are faster to 
correctly response to antecedent-affect congruent statements (e.g., ‘bad events make me feel 
sad’) than incongruent statements (e.g., ‘bad events make me feel happy’). In contrast the 
overall negative DRRT scores indicate faster correct antecedent-affect incongruent responses 
than congruent responses. Therefore, participants are faster to correctly respond to 
antecedent-affect incongruent statements (e.g., ‘bad events make me feel happy’) than 





 The DRRT scores are standardized scores (i.e., they are in SD units). A descriptive 
analysis of the DRRT scores showed that prior to the mood induction DRRT scores ranged from 
-0.44 to 0.92, with a mean DRRT score of .22 (SD = .39SD). In contrast, the DRRT scores 
following the sad mood induction ranged from -0.80 to 0.57, with a mean score of .12 (SD = 
.39SD).  
Table 3 
Calculation for DRRT Scores Used in Recent RRT Research 
Step Description 
1 Only the data from the target statements for the test blocks are used.  
2 Latencies over 10,000ms are removed from the dataset. 
3 Two mean latencies are calculated for each participant. One for the congruent 
block and one for the incongruent block.  
4 One ‘inclusive’ standard deviation for the congruent and incongruent blocks is 
calculated for each participant.  
5 One mean difference is calculated for each participant. The mean latency of the 
congruent block is subtracted from the mean latency of the incongruent block.  
6 One DRRT score is calculated is then calculated for each participant. The mean 
difference calculated in step five is divided by the corresponding standard 
deviation calculated in step four. Resulting in one DRRT score for each RRT 
procedure.  




Notes. One DRRT score is calculated for each RRT procedure, e.g., pre and post mood 
induction 
 
Correlational Analysis  
Bivariate Pearon’s correlations between the DRRT scores pre- and post-mood induction 
and the questionnaires are shown in Table 4. Interestingly, the DRRT scores pre-mood 
induction displayed a non-significant correlation with the DRRT scores post-mood induction (r 
= .15, p> .05).  This suggests there are changes in DRRT scores which may be caused by 





scores were not significantly correlated with DASS depression scores (r = -.29, p > .05), 
However, the DRRT scores post-mood induction displayed a strong significant positive 
correlation with the DASS depression scores (r = .61, p < .05). This suggests sad mood may 
have had an impact on depressive individuals’ DRRT scores; again, this will also be analysed 
later. Both the DRRT scores pre- and post-mood induction did not significantly correlate with 
the remaining questionnaires (p = 0.27 to 0.99). Finally, the AAQ-II displayed a strong 
significant correlation with the RRQ-rumination scale (r = .69, p < .01). This suggests the 
RRQ-rumination is measuring similar aspects of psychological flexibility to the AAQ-II. 
Table 4  
Correlations Between DRRT Scores and Questionnaires  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 DRRT Pre - 0.15 -0.29 -0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.05 
2 DRRT Post  - -0.61
** 
0.17 -0.33 0.04 0.09 0.09 
3 DASS –Depression   - 0.35 0.58
* 
0.08 0.03 -0.22 
4 DASS - Anxiety    - 0.35 0.21 0.18 -0.18 
5 DASS – Stress     - 0.26 0.42 -0.12 
6 AAQ-II      - 0.69
** 
0.35 
7 RRQ-Rumination       - 0.18 
8 RRQ-Reflection        - 
** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
* p < .05 (two-tailed) 
 
PANAS Mood Induction Manipulation Check  
 The PANAS was included as a mood manipulation check by comparing PANAS 
scores before and after the sad mood induction. The PANAS has two subscales which 
measure positive and negative affect with scores ranging from 10-50 on both. Higher scores 
on the positive affect subscale represent higher levels of positive affect, whereas lower scores 






Figure 4. Mean overall PANAS scores for the positive and negative affect subscales, pre and 
post the sad mood induction procedure.  
Figure 4 shows the mean PANAS positive and negative affect scores before and after 
the sad mood induction. As we can see this displays a substantial decrease in positive affect 
between pre-mood induction (M = 27.53, SD = 8.09) and post-mood induction (M = 21.41, 
SD = 6.06). This is confirmed by a significant paired t-test, t(16) = 4.54, p < .01, 95% CI 
[3.26, 8.97], which suggest that the sad mood induction significantly decreased the positive 
valence. However, we can also see there is no substantial change in negative affect between 
pre-mood induction (M = 14.82, SD = 5.53) and post-mood induction (M = 13.59, SD = 
4.56). This is confirmed by a non-significant paired t-test (p > .20), which suggests the sad 
mood induction had no substantial effect on the negative valence.   
Depressive Groups Status and RRT 
I conducted a 2x2 [2 levels of depression (between-subjects) and 2 times of 
measurement (within-subjects), pre- and post-mood induction] ANOVA (with repeated 
measures on the time factor) to examine the effect of the sad mood induction procedure on 
mean DRRT scores as a function of Depression symptom levels. The DRRT scores were the 
dependent variable, the assigned depressive groups were the between-subjects independent 
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Mauchley’s test of sphericity yielded no significant results, therefore, homogeneity of 
variance between groups can be assumed. No substantial differences were found between the 
overall mean DRRT scores before and after the sad mood induction procedure. This is 
confirmed by the non-significant effect of time of measurement in the 2x2 ANOVA (p > .40).  
 
Figure 5. Depression groups emotional response biases on the RRT pre and post mood 
induction. Positive DRRT scores mean participants were faster to provide correct ‘antecedent-
affect’ congruent responses (e.g., ‘when things go well, I feel happy’) than incongruent 
responses. Negative DRRT scores mean participants were faster to provide correct ‘antecedent-
affect’ incongruent response (e.g., ‘when things go well, I feel sad’), than congruent 
responses. 
Figure 5 shows the mean DRRT scores for the depressive groups before and after the 
sad mood induction. The normal group displayed an antecedent-affect congruent response 
bias both before and after the sad mood induction. In contrast the mild-moderate depressive 
group initially displayed an antecedent-affect congruent response bias pre-mood induction, 
then an incongruent response bias post-mood induction. Figure 5 illustrates the mean DRRT 
scores which are trending towards an interaction between the sad mood induction and 
depressive groups. This trend towards an interaction is from the normal group maintaining an 
antecedent-affect congruent response bias post-mood induction, whereas the mild-moderate 




























following the mood-induction procedure. This trend, however, was not statistically 
significant as confirmed by the non-significant interaction between time of measurement and 
depressive group in the 2x2 ANOVA (p > .60). However, we can see there is a substantial 
difference between the normal and mild-moderate depressive groups’ means, suggesting the 
depressive groups display differences in responding.  This is confirmed by the significant 
main effect of depressive group in the 2x2 ANOVA, F(1,15) = 12.25, p < .05, ɳp
2
 = .45. 
Furthermore, the partial eta squared suggests a large effect on the group on responding. 
Two additional independent t-tests were conducted to compare depressive group mean 
DRRT scores before and after the mood induction. I also conducted Levene’s homogeneity of 
variance tests and when the data violated the assumption of homogeneity, I did not assume 
equality of variance. During the pre-mood induction, the normal (M = .38, SD = .28) and 
mild-moderate (M = .05, SD = .43) depressive groups displayed a small difference in mean 
DRRT scores. The independent t-test confirms there was no significant difference between the 
two groups prior to mood induction (p > .05). However post-mood induction, the normal (M 
= .33, SD = .22) group displayed higher mean DRRT scores than the mild-moderate (M = -.11, 
SD = .42) depressive group. The independent t-test confirmed there was a significant 
difference between the two groups post-mood induction, t(15) = 2.73, p < .05, 95% CI [.10, 
.78]. 
In summary, the sad mood induction procedure showed no significant interaction with 
depressive group status, however, the sad mood induction procedure did effect the mild-
moderate depressive groups’ responding on the RRT, which resulted in the change from a 
congruent to an incongruent response bias.  This change was also significantly different from 







AAQ-II and RRT 
The AAQ-II was included as an exploratory measure of psychological flexibility. The 
AAQ-II is scored from 7 to 49, with lower scores representing higher levels of psychological 
flexibility and higher scores representing lower levels of psychological flexibility. The AAQ-
II mean was 22.12 (SD = 6.70) with scores ranging from 11 to 33, and overall distribution 
relatively close to normal (skewness = -0.01). The participants were divided into two post-
hoc groups based on their AAQ-II scores using a mean split (Graddy, 2015). Participants with 
overall AAQ-II scores below the mean were defined as the ‘high flexibility’ group (n = 10, M 
= 17.40, SD = 3.80). The remaining participants with AAQ-II scores above the mean were 
defined as ‘low flexibility’ group (n = 7, M = 28.86, SD = 2.73).  
As can be seen by the frequencies cross tabulated in Table 5, there is no significant 
relationship between the DASS depressive groups and the AAQ-II psychological flexibility 
groups χ
2 
= .08, p > .70. In summary five of the nine normal participants were grouped as 
high flexibility and the remaining four were grouped as low flexibility, whereas five of the 
eight mild/moderate depressive participants were grouped as high flexibility and the 
remaining three were grouped as low flexibility.  
Table 5 
Cross-tab of the AAQ-II Groups and DASS Depression Groups.  
 AAQ-II Group  




Normal 5 4 9 
Mild/Moderate 5 3 8 
 Total 10 7 17 
 
The same 2x2 ANOVA (with repeated measures on the time factor) analysis used 
previously to examine the effect of depression symptom status on DRRT scores was used to 
examine the joint effect of the sad mood induction and psychological flexibility on DRRT 





group was the between-subjects independent variable and the pre-post mood induction was 
the within-subjects’ independent variable. Mauchley’s test was non-significant, therefore 
sphericity could be assumed. No substantial differences were found between the overall mean 
DRRT scores before and after the sad mood induction, as confirmed by the non-significant 
effect of time of measurement in the 2x2 ANOVA (p > .40). 
 
Figure 6. AAQ-II high flexibility and low flexibility groups emotional response biases on the 
RRT pre and post mood induction. Positive DRRT scores mean participants were faster to 
provide correct ‘antecedent-affect’ congruent responses (e.g., ‘when things go well, I feel 
happy’) than incongruent responses. Negative DRRT scores mean participants were faster to 
provide correct ‘antecedent-affect’ incongruent response (e.g., ‘when things go well, I feel 
sad’) than incongruent responses. 
Figure 6 shows the mean DRRT scores for the psychological flexibility group before 
and after the sad mood induction procedure. The graph shows that both high and low 
psychological flexibility groups display an antecedent-affect congruent response bias before 
and after the mood induction procedure. The lack of substantial difference between the two 
group means suggests there were no substantial group difference in responding on the RRT. 
The 2x2 ANOVA confirms this, as the main effect of psychological flexibility was non-
significant (p > .95). In addition to the lack of difference between the group means, the 
psychological flexibility groups both displayed similar decreases in mean DRRT scores post-
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flexibility and there was no significant interaction between time of measurement and 
psychological flexibility group (p > .90). In summary, there was no significant difference 
between the high and low psychological flexibility groups mean DRRT scores before or after 
the sad mood induction procedure. 
RRQ and RRT 
 The RRQ was also included as an exploratory measure of rumination. For the purpose 
of this study only the rumination subscale is of interest. RRQ rumination subscale scores 
range from 12 to 60, with higher scores reflecting greater levels of rumination. The 
participants’ rumination scores ranged from 25 to 56 with a mean of 44.24 (SD = 8.07). The 
overall distribution of the ruination scores was asymmetrical, negatively skewed towards 
lower rumination scores (skewness = -0.82). The participants were divided into two post-hoc 
groups based on their RRQ rumination scores, using a mean split (Graddy, 2015). 
Participants rumination scores below the mean were defined as the ‘low rumination’ group (n 
= 6, M = 36.00, SD = 6.93) and the remaining participants with scores above the mean were 
defined as the ‘high rumination’ group (n = 11, M = 48.73, SD = 4.15). As can be seen by the 
frequencies cross tabulated in Table 6, there is no significant relationship between the 
depressive groups and the rumination groups, χ
2 
= .70, p > .40. In summary, four of the nine 
normal participants were grouped as low rumination and the remaining five were grouped as 
high rumination, in contrast two of the eight mild/moderate participants were grouped as low 
rumination and the remaining six were grouped as high rumination. 
Table 6  
Cross-tab of the Rumination Groups and DASS Depression Groups. 
 RRQ Rumination Groups  




Normal 4 5 9 
Mild/Moderate 2 6 8 






The same 2x2 ANOVA (with repeated measures on the time factor) analysis used 
previously to analyse DRRT scores was used to examine the effect of the sad mood induction 
on the rumination groups DRRT scores. The DRRT scores were the dependent variable, the 
assigned rumination group was the between-subjects independent variable and the pre-post 
mood induction was the within-subjects’ independent variable. Mauchley’s test was non-
significant, therefore sphericity could be assumed. No substantial differences were found 
between the overall mean DRRT scores before and after the sad mood induction, as confirmed 
by the non-significant effect of time of measurement in the 2x2 ANOVA (p > .60). 
 
Figure 7. RRQ-rumination groups emotional response biases on the RRT pre and post mood 
induction. Positive DRRT scores mean participants were faster to provide correct ‘antecedent-
affect’ congruent responses (e.g., ‘when things go well, I feel happy’) than incongruent 
responses. Negative DRRT scores mean participants were faster to provide correct ‘antecedent-
affect’ incongruent response (e.g., ‘when things go well, I feel sad’) than incongruent 
responses. 
Figure 7 shows the mean DRRT scores for the rumination groups before and after the 
sad mood induction. The graph shows the both high and low rumination groups display 
antecedent-affect congruent response biases both before and after the sad mood induction. At 
first glance it would appear there is small difference between group means at pre-mood 
induction, and a larger difference between group means post-mood induction, however, these 
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between groups, confirmed by the lack of a statistically significant effect of group on 
responding (p > .70). The graph also appears to show a decrease in DRRT scores post-mood 
induction for the high rumination, and an increase in DRRT scores for low rumination. This 
would suggest an interaction between the sad mood induction and the rumination groups, 
however, there was no significant interaction between the sad mood induction procedure and 
the rumination groups (p > .30). In summary, there was no significant difference between the 
high and low rumination groups mean DRRT scores before or after the sad mood induction 
procedure. 
Specificity of RRT to Depressive Symptoms 
 Previous analysis showed there was no significant interaction between sad mood 
induction and the depressive groups DRRT scores. However, there was a significant difference 
in DRRT scores post-mood induction. Therefore, I conducted additional analyses to examine 
the specificity of the RRT as an implicit measure of any relationship between mood induction 
and depression levels by comparing the data assorted by anxiety and stress DASS scores 
rather than depression. As for the depressive groups factor, the participants stress and anxiety 
scores were used to create ‘normal’ and ‘mild-moderate’ post-hoc groups using the cut off 
values taken from the DASS manual (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993).  Participants’ anxiety 
and stress scores are presented below in Table 7. 
Table 7  
Scores Obtained from the DASS Stress and Anxiety Scales, Including the Cut-off Scores Used 
to Divide Groups. 
 Anxiety Stress 
 Cut-off 
Score 
n M (SD) 
Cut-off 
Score 
n M (SD) 
Normal 0 – 7 9 4.67 (1.73) 0 - 14 12 10.00 (4.18) 






 The same two 2x2 [2 levels of anxiety or stress (between-subjects) and 2 times of 
measurement (within-subjects), pre- and post-mood induction] ANOVA analyses (with 
repeated measures on the time factor) as used previously were conducted separately for the 
anxiety and stress groups. This was to examine the effect of the sad mood induction 
procedure on the DRRT scores when participants were differentiated by anxiety and stress 
rather than depression. The results showed there was no significant effect of sad mood for 
either the stress group (F(1,15) = 1.79, p > .20, ɳp
2
 = .11) or the anxiety group (F(1,14) = 
1.18, p > .30, ɳp
2
 = .08). There was also no significant interaction found for either the stress 
group (F(1,15) = .47, p > .50, ɳp
2
 = .03) or the anxiety group (F(1,14) = .17, p > .60, ɳp
2
 = 
.01). Therefore, the results suggest the RRT may indeed be an implicit measure of the 
relationship between sad mood induction and depression levels, and cannot be generalised to 
stress and anxiety. This is expected considering that the RRT stimuli was originally 
developed from the DASS depression scale (see Hussey and Barnes-Holmes, 2012).  
Discussion 
The current study is a pilot study that sought to examine the utility of the RRT as an 
implicit measure of cognitive reactivity using a convenience sample of individuals without 
clinical symptoms of depression by replicating Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). My 
overall hypotheses were that, as a result of the sad mood induction procedure, the depressive, 
psychological flexibility and rumination groups would all display similar patterns of 
differential change in emotional responses to life events. However, anxiety and stress groups 
were predicted to display no patterns of differential change in emotional responses to life 
events. Furthermore, these patterns would be consistent with the findings by Hussey and 
Barnes-Holmes (2012), which found differential responding patterns of change in response to 





Results of the current study indicated the sad mood induction was effective at 
inducing a sad mood. However, effects on the RRT can be attributed to a decrease in positive 
affect rather than an increase in negative valence. The depressive participants were the only 
groups to display results that were consistent with Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) by 
displaying the differential responding patterns of change in response to the sad mood 
induction. Whereas, the psychological flexibility and rumination groups did not display any 
differential responding patterns of change in response to the sad mood induction, which is 
inconsistent with the findings by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). 
DASS Groups  
Prior to the mood induction procedure both normal and mild-moderate depressive 
groups displayed an antecedent-affect congruent response bias, however, after the mood 
induction procedure, the normal depressive group continued to display an antecedent-affect 
congruent response bias; whereas the mild-moderate depressive group shifted to display an 
antecedent-affect incongruent response bias. The pattern of differential change displayed by 
the depressive groups supports the hypothesis. These results show that the mood induction 
procedure impacted on the emotional responses of participants demonstrating mild-moderate 
levels of depressive symptoms but not participants demonstrating normal levels of depressive 
symptoms. The relationship between sad mood and depressive group is further supported by 
the significant correlation between the post-mood induction DRRT scores and the depression 
subscale scores. These findings are consistent with Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), which 
conceptually suggests mild-moderate depressive individuals’ emotional reactions to life 
events are sensitive to mood state effects. It also provides promising evidence that the RRT is 
a valid measure of cognitive reactivity. 
On the other hand, comparing groups separated by anxiety and stress scores on the 





mood induction. These findings confirm the hypothesis and therefore are consistent with 
Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) and also suggests that mood state dependent effects on the 
RRT can be attributable to depressive symptoms specifically rather than psychopathology 
generally. As Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) suggested, a lack of differential changes is 
unsurprising considering the stimuli was derived from the DASS depression scale, and sad 
mood effects have been established within depression (Roefs et al., 2011; Gemar et al., 
2001). In summary, the effects on the RRT for the depressive, anxiety and stress groups are 
all consistent with Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), which suggests the RRT is indeed a 
reliable measure of cognitive reactivity.  
It is important to note that this conclusion is pertinent only to the RRT task when the 
stimuli presented are contrived to be specific to depression. It is conceivable that an RRT task 
with anxiety (or stress)-related sets of stimuli, and a mood-induction procedure designed to 
induce anxiety (or stress) might demonstrate that the RRT, as an implicit responding task, 
was able to detect response biases resulting from implicit beliefs in domains other than 
depression. This possibly needs further investigation. Such generality of implicit response 
tasks is intrinsic to general theories of the relationship between (implicit) cognition and 
action, and such a demonstration would strengthen the wider theory linking the two 
phenomena.  
These results tentatively suggest the more an individual is experiencing the symptoms 
of depression, the more susceptible they are to mood state dependent effects, which is 
consistent with previous literature (Teasdale, 1988; Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). In 
essence, this means that during a normal emotional state, depressive individuals are likely to 
favour emotional reactions that are consistent with the event (e.g., When good things happen, 
I feel happy). However, while experiencing a sad mood, they are likely to favour emotional 





These findings are consistent with Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), which indicates that 
the RRT is able to detect and measure cognitive reactivity. Specifically, the RRT is able to 
detect the negative responding patterns activated by the sad mood in the mild-moderate 
depressive participants, which is not seen in normal depressive participants.   
Psychological Flexibility 
The results of dividing the sample by levels of psychological flexibility showed that, 
prior to the mood induction procedure, both the high and low psychological flexibility groups 
displayed an antecedent-affect congruent response bias. After the mood induction procedure, 
both groups continued to display the antecedent-affect congruent response bias. Therefore, 
these results do not support the study hypothesis because there is no pattern of differential 
change found between the psychological flexibility groups. The lack of change can be 
attributed the mood induction procedure having no impact on the emotional responses of the 
participants demonstrating high or low levels of psychological flexibility. These results, 
tentatively suggest the high and low psychological flexibility individuals are not susceptible 
to mood state effects. In essence, this means the individuals are likely to favour emotional 
reactions that are consistent with the event (e.g., When good things happen, I feel happy), 
regardless of their emotional state. These findings are inconsistent with previous literature 
(Bond et al., 2011, Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012) and suggests the RRT is not a valid 
implicit measure to detect cognitive reactivity. Specifically, the RRT was unable to detect 
any significant changes in responding patterns caused by the sad mood induction, however, 
the differences between my study and Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) may be due to 
limitations of my study rather than the RRT. 
One explanation for the difference between Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) and 
this study could be the differences between our psychological flexibility groups and the 





are as follows. Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) sample consisted of 18 participants 
defined as low psychological flexibility and 12 participants defined as high psychological 
flexibility (post-hoc) based on the 10-item AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011), whereas my sample 
consisted of 7 participants defined as low psychological flexibility and 10 participants 
defined as high psychological flexibility post-hoc based on the 7-item AAQ-II (Bond et al., 
2011a). The 7-item AAQ-II was selected for this study because it displayed better 
psychometric consistency than the 10-item AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011a). Although both 
samples were created using similar measures of psychological flexibility, Hussey and Barnes-
Holmes (2012) groups reflected more extreme levels of high and low psychological 
flexibility because the groups were separated by > 2 standard errors. Whereas in my study, 
the two groups of psychological flexibility were closer to the mean because they were 
separated by a mean split and therefore the two samples were less well differentiated on the 
psychological flexibility dimension. 
Another explanation for these differences could be the overlap between the depressive 
groups and the psychological flexibility groups in our studies. Hussey and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012) high psychological flexibility group was relatively similar to the normal depressive 
group and the low psychological flexibility group was relatively similar to the mild-moderate 
depressive group. The consistency between these groups is one explanation for why Hussey 
and Barnes-Holmes (2012) were able to find similar IRAP effects. Whereas in my study the 
high and low psychological flexibility groups were different to the normal and mild-moderate 
depressive groups. The lack of overlap between the groups within my study may be a result 
of using the 7-item AAQ-II. These differences could be addressed in future research by 
increasing the sample size to increase power and reduce type two errors, use the original 10-







Prior to the mood induction procedure both the high and low rumination groups 
displayed an antecedent-affect congruent response bias. After the mood induction procedure, 
both groups continued to display the antecedent-affect congruent response bias. Therefore, 
these results do not support the study hypothesis, because there was no pattern of differential 
change found between the rumination groups. This is a result of the mood induction 
procedure having no impact on the emotional responses of the participants demonstrating 
either high or low levels of rumination and tentatively suggests that the high and low 
rumination individuals are not susceptible to mood state effects. In essence, this means that 
individuals are likely to favour emotional reactions that are consistent with the event 
regardless of their emotional state, independent of their tendency to ruminate. These findings 
are inconsistent with previous literature (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Moulds et al., 
2008; Lo, Ho, Hollon, 2007), and again tentatively suggests that the RRT may not be a valid 
implicit measure of cognitive reactivity for individuals differentiated by rumination level. 
Specifically, the RRT was unable to detect any significant change in responding patterns 
caused by the sad mood as a function of rumination levels. 
Although the RRT was unable to detect any significant changes pre and post mood 
induction between the high and low rumination groups, it was able to detect some changes. 
As expected the high rumination group displayed a decrease in antecedent-affect congruent 
responses bias by trending towards an incongruent response bias however this change did not 
reach statistical significance. This suggests that the RRT is able to detect differences in 
cognitive reactivity between groups and the lack of any significant relationship may be a 
result of the limitations of the current study rather than the RRT. The small sample within the 
current study was not normally distributed and is one potential explanation for a lack of 





because it is susceptible to type two errors.  Another potential explanation could be method 
used to create the rumination groups and how these groups overlapped with the depressive 
groups. The rumination groups were created post-hoc using a mean split based on the 
participants’ rumination scores. Therefore, the two groups may not have distinctively 
represented high and low rumination groups independent of depression symptoms. Although 
it must be noted that high levels of rumination are thought to be a vulnerability factor to 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), suggesting that these are not independent dimensions of 
individual difference. In addition, both rumination groups consisted of normal and mild-
moderate depressive participants. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the effects on the RRT for 
the rumination groups were not similar to the depressive groups. To address these limitations, 
I would recommend increasing the sample size and creating two rumination groups that 
represent greater extremes of high and low rumination.   
Comparison of RRT and IRAP 
 The RRT was selected as the implicit measurement procedure because of its 
advantages over the IRAP (see De Houwer et al., 2015). All participants successfully 
completed the RRT procedure, and no participants were removed due to their performance on 
the RRT. Therefore, the low attrition rate found in my study is consistent with previous RRT 
research (De Houwer et al., 2015). The completion and attrition rates for the IRAP were not 
reported by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). Therefore, we were unable to confirm if the 
RRT has lower attrition rates than the IRAP. Previous research has suggested the RRT 
requires less time to complete than the IRAP (De Houwer et al., 2015). Unfortunately, 
Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012) did not report the amount of time participants spent 
completing the IRAP, therefore, I am unable to confirm if the RRT requires less time to 
complete than the IRAP. In addition, the administration of the RRT is identified as another 





any explicit responding rules which increases the difficulty of the procedure. As a 
consequence, while the participants individually completed the IRAP the experimenter had to 
be seated near the participant during the instructional phases to provide assistance. In contrast 
the RRT has explicit responding instructions and in my study, participants were able to 
complete the RRT procedure in groups. This is an advantage of the RRT because collecting 
data is less time consuming than the IRAP. In summary, performance on the RRT in my 
study is consistent with previous research (De Houwer et al., 2015) which suggests that the 
RRT does have advantages over the IRAP, however, I am unable to confirm these advantages 
due to insufficient information provided by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). 
Limitations, Applications, Future Research and Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the validity of the RRT as an implicit 
measure of cognitive reactivity. However, limitations of the current study may provide 
explanations as to why I was unable to replicate the findings of Hussey and Barnes-Holmes 
(2012). These limitations are not necessarily specific to the RRT as an implicit measure but 
rather a result of the design of the current study. Two limitations, namely the small sample 
size and group analysis have already been noted above and recommendations to address them 
in future research have been provided. Another limitation which has not been highlighted is 
the lack of measurement validity of the RRT. As mentioned in my introduction, statements 
corresponding with the DASS subscales, ‘dysphoria’, ‘devaluation of life’ and ‘inertia’ were 
removed from the original set of stimuli to meet the technical limitations of the RRT. 
Removing the stimuli, may be one explanation for why the findings in the current study were 
inconsistent with previous literature. This limitation could be addressed in future research by 
validating which stimuli are most susceptible to sad mood effects within samples 





 My exploratory study has provided some evidence that the RRT can be used as an 
implicit measure of cognitive reactivity. However, the findings of the current study do not 
provide strong support for this proposition. However, these results are inconsistent with 
previous research may be caused by the limitations of the study rather than the RRT itself. 
Therefore, my study provides initial evidence that he RRT could be applied as an implicit 
measure of cognitive reactivity. More research is needed to validate the utility of the RRT as 
an implicit measure of cognitive reactivity.   
Due to the lack of research verifying the utility, validity and employability of the RRT 
as an implicit measure, a large number of recommendations could be made, however, based 
on the findings of the current study, I have suggested the following recommendations. As 
previously mentioned addressing the limitations of the current study is the first 
recommendation. This would help determine if the results of the current study are 
inconsistent with previous literature due to the small sample size and group analysis rather 
than the RRT. 
The current study utilised a convenience sample of undergraduate students. I suggest 
future research could replicate the design of the current study using samples of people classed 
as depressed and remitted-depressed based on clinical history. This would provide evidence 
for the utility of the RRT as an implicit measure of cognitive reactivity within various 
populations.  
The current study identified that prior to the mood induction there was no difference 
in responding between groups. These findings are consistent with previous research (Hussey 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Gemar et al., 2001). Therefore, if any research seeks to replicate the 
study there is established literature to accept the premise that the negative mood is necessary 
to observed group differences and future research would be able to use a shorter paradigm 





 To conclude, this study sought to explore the utility of the RRT as an implicit measure 
of cognitive reactivity by replicating the study by Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012). Its 
purpose was to examine if the RRT is able to implicitly measure cognitive reactivity and 
display patterns of differential change that were similar to those observed using the IRAP. As 
expected, the individuals differentiated by levels of depression symptoms displayed patterns 
of differential change while those differentiated by anxiety and stress symptoms did not. 
These findings are consistent with Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), which suggest the 
RRT is a potentially valid implicit measure of cognitive reactivity, however, the 
psychological flexibility and rumination groups unexpectedly displayed no patterns of 
differential change. Although these results were inconsistent with previous research, they 
may be due to limitations of the current study rather than the RRT. These findings provide 
initial evidence for the RRT being an implicit measure of cognitive reactivity. However, this 
study was exploratory and more research is clearly needed to validate the utility of the RRT 
as a measure of cognitive reactivity within various populations. Furthermore, research could 
compare the RRT with other implicit measures of cognitive reactivity, to explore the 
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